Luis Enrique and coaching staff celebrate winning the Champions League (Matthias Hangst/Getty Images)
With the first official match of the 15/16 season upon us, cules are eagerly looking forward to Luis Enrique’s second year in charge. Questions are swirling about possible departures and youth promotions, and expectations are building as to whether Barça can defend their titles in three competitions. Problem is, nobody seemed to give enough credit to how the treble actually happened in the first place. It blindsided a pessimistic fanbase who had convinced themselves of crisis in January, and by the time people actually wrapped their heads around what was happening, it was already over. Before we move into a new season, new struggles, and higher expectations for Luis Enrique, we need to retrace his monumental accomplishment.
The dominant narrative of Barça’s world-conquering triumph last season was that of a collective bounce back from the bottom, driven by sheer determination and the individual brilliance of Lionel Messi, Luis Suárez, and Neymar Jr. Because success happened so suddenly for the fans, it felt like it must have been that way for the team. Not so. The mistake there is to forget the problems and expectations Luis Enrique was facing at this time a year ago – the team did not come ready-made for a treble.
First off, the famed MSN – how would they all fit together? Where would they play? Suárez and Messi weren’t the only question marks. Many had spent the 13/14 season arguing that Neymar was being wasted on the left wing, and that he needed to play a more central role, as in Brazil, to really shine. His superb performances from that position during the winter months Messi spent injured only strengthened those claims. Luis Enrique’s early diamond 4-4-2, with Messi as a number 10 behind Neymar and Pedro, seemingly solved that problem, but created several others.
One player who particularly suffered in Luis Enrique’s early system was Andrés Iniesta. And while it was partly formational, it hinted at a larger question: if Messi is playing midfield, how do he and Iniesta coexist? Both magicians like to dribble and drift around the field – if they occupied the same space, the center of the pitch could easily be overrun. If Messi were to make his inevitable shift to a number 10, it was conjectured, Iniesta might have to be sacrificed, replaced with someone more industrious like Ivan Rakitić or Javier Mascherano.
Coming off of a stellar World Cup, Mascherano had made a strong case for being used in midfield, while many still doubted his abilities as a centre-back. His partner Gerard Piqué, who was singled out by Vicente del Bosque as a weakness in Spain’s disastrous group stage exit, drew similar skepticism, and many hoped that Barcelona would make two centre-back signings to supplant the existing starters entirely. When Mehdi Benatia somehow failed to join Barça, cules were furious and predicted the worst for Barça’s defense.
In fact, virtually the only member of Barça’s defense who went unquestioned a year ago was Jordi Alba. Dani Alves‘ form had deteriorated so much over two years that he became a downright liability, and would continue to be well into November of 2014. Having to provide width as a wing-back in Barça’s early 4-4-2 only exacerbated the situation, leaving him isolated high up the pitch and forced to either recycle possession or cross poorly. Claudio Bravo, meanwhile, was deemed a waste of money and not “Barça-quality.”
These were the problems and expectations Luis Enrique was facing a year ago. And what’s remarkable is not just that the team came together and eventually arrived at a winning formula, but how many problems it solved at once. Think about the key tenets of the Luis Enrique system and the solutions it opened up for the team.
2) Defensive solidity: Barça’s early play in 14/15 wasn’t particularly pretty, but it established a defensive base that the team would build on for the rest of the season. The back four were extraordinarily well-drilled, working perfectly as a unit regardless of which players featured at centre-back. This defensive strength would later be the platform which allowed MSN to take risks and play directly without fear of counter-attack. Although Mascherano and Piqué each eventually reached a high level, playing some of the best football of their careers, it was the collective success that comes from good coaching that really shone throughout the season.
3) Rakitić forward, Dani Alves deep: In an inversion of their early relationship, Rakitić eventually moved further up the pitch while Dani Alves took a more conservative position, maximizing the skillsets of both. The Croatian’s tactical brilliance and workrate made him the perfect foil for Messi off the ball, moving out wide or forward as needed to balance out the Argentine’s positioning. Alves, on the other hand, linked up with Messi on the ball, frequently moving into midfield where his supreme associative play and passing range were better used, and his weaknesses minimized. He also was vital in the midfield press, cutting out countless counterattacks early alongside Sergio Busquets.
4) Andrés Iniesta holds it all together: The same pattern did not hold true on the left, however. Jordi Alba is better used out wide, and Neymar was more direct than Messi on the dribble. It fell to Iniesta, then, to play a deeper role, becoming a more Xavi-like orchestrator and not taking risks on the ball. When Alba or Neymar ran out of options, they always had Iniesta to turn to, who would then spread the play and keep it moving. He also put in a number of excellent tackles defensively to keep Busquets from being overrun, adding a surprisingly physical aspect to his game.
Luis Suárez was of course vital, but his role in the team was less of a surprise and more exactly what was expected of him, just better. Credit to Barça’s management for taking the risk to break their transfer fee record on a controversial player, but the Uruguayan was an absolutely perfect fit for the team Luis Enrique had in mind. As I wrote early last summer, the two Luises had the potential to transform their team much in the same way Diego Simeone and Diego Costa did Atlético, and so they did.
Suárez was, ironically, pretty much the only part of Barça’s team that didn’t require tinkering when Luis Enrique took over. He slotted right in, but the rest needed to be carefully, sometimes greatly, reworked and managed to arrive at the Barça we now know in 2015. The team didn’t come treble-made in a box, nor did it forge itself together out of the fires of crisis in a single week in January. It was a long, complicated process for Luis Enrique, and it will continue to be so this season. But in looking back at how far he’s come in a single year and how many problems he managed to solve seemingly all at once, perhaps he’ll inspire some patience and tempered expectations this time around.
